What were the IEEPA tariffs?

The IEEPA tariffs were duties imposed by the executive branch under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a statute that authorizes the President to regulate certain economic transactions during a declared national emergency. Historically, IEEPA has been used to impose sanctions and restrict financial flows—not to impose broad-based tariffs on imported goods.

Beginning in 2025, the government relied on IEEPA to impose sweeping tariffs on a wide range of imports. Those tariffs applied across tens of millions of individual import entries and affected hundreds of thousands of importers. In total, they generated approximately $166  billion in duties.

The central legal question—now resolved by the Supreme Court—was whether IEEPA actually authorizes the imposition of tariffs at all. The Court held that it does not.

What did the Supreme Court rule?

In Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, the Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. In other words, the duties collected under the IEEPA tariff program were unlawful.

That ruling is decisive on the legality of the tariffs themselves. It means that, as a matter of substantive law, importers should not have owed those duties in the first place.

But the Court’s decision did not itself address refunds. It did not create a nationwide refund program. It did not direct Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to automatically return money to all affected importers. And it did not displace the statutory procedures that govern how importers challenge duties and obtain refunds.

As a result, the key question now is not whether the tariffs were unlawful—that is settled—but how, and through what procedures, importers can actually recover the duties they paid.

What has the Court of International Trade said about refunds?

The legal questions regarding refunds have returned to the Court of International Trade (CIT), which has assigned the approximately 3,000 cases already filed to Judge Richard Eaton. Judge Eaton designated Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States as the lead case. 

On March 4, 2026, Judge Eaton issued an order directing Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to issue refunds to all 330,000 importers who paid IEEPA tariff duties—not just to the plaintiff in Atmus Filtration. In the hearing at which Judge Eaton issued the order, the government stated that it intended to appeal the March 4 order.

Since then, Judge Eaton has “suspended” the March 4 order while CBP has built a new system to process refunds—the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE). Because Judge Eaton paused his March 4 order, the government has not yet paid any refunds. The case has thus been in a holding pattern for over a month, and the government has not yet appealed the March 4 order.

On April 7, 2026, Atmus Filtration voluntarily dismissed its case. No reasons were given publicly, but it could be because the government settled the case or because the company no longer wanted to serve as the lead plaintiff. On April 8, Judge Eaton designated Euro-Notions Florida, Inc. v. United States as the new lead case. He immediately reissued his March 4 order in Euro-Notions.

Once CBP completes CAPE—it has indicated that it anticipates doing so around April 20, 2026—Judge Eaton will probably un-suspend the March 4/April 7 order. At that point, the government would have to either open CAPE to all 330,000 importers or appeal the order.

What is CAPE and what are its limitations?

CAPE, the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries, is a new computer system CBP is building to process refunds. After the CIT ordered CBP to issue refunds to all importers, CBP explained that its existing ACE system lacked the functionality to do so. According to CBP, CAPE will be operational on April 20, 2026.

CAPE is a technical tool to process refunds, and as a result it faces important limitations. The first important limitation is the legal question of which importers are entitled to use CAPE. Judge Eaton’s March 4/April 7 order purports to direct CBP to open CAPE to all importers. But the government has repeatedly stated that, in its view, only importers who sue in court will receive refunds. CBP describes CAPE as a system to process “refund requests made pursuant to court order and in accordance with appropriate statutory authority by providing an electronic pathway to submit valid IEEPA duty refund claims.” For that reason, there is a good chance that the government will appeal the March 4/April 7 order. And for reasons discussed below, it is likely that the government will prevail in that appeal.

The second important limitation is CBP’s own explanation of the restrictions on the entries CAPE can process. For importers who submit claims pursuant to a court order and in accordance with appropriate statutory authority, CAPE will process “most entries that are either unliquidated or up to 80 days past the liquidation date.” That restriction reflects the limitations on CBP’s statutory authority. For unliquidated entries, the relevant statutes permit—but do not require—CBP to  liquidate without the IEEPA duties. For liquidated entries, Section 1501 strictly limits CBP’s authority by permitting—but not requiring—CBP to reliquidate entries only until 90 days after the entry was liquidated. For entries past that 90-day window, CBP may not lawfully reliquidate without a protest, a court order, or both.

In sum, if the government prevails in an appeal of the March 4/April 7 order, then the only importers who will be eligible to use CAPE are those who protested, sued, or both. And even if the March 4/April 7 stands, CAPE cannot legally process the tens of millions of entries that are beyond the 80-day window past liquidation.

Will the government automatically issue refunds to all importers?

No, probably not.

Although Judge Eaton’s March 4/April 7 order claimed to order CBP to issue refunds automatically to all 330,000 importers who paid IEEPA tariffs, the government is likely to appeal the universal scope of that order. The government stated in court that its position is that only importers who sue will receive refunds. 

Based on recent Supreme Court precedent, we believe the government is likely to win that appeal. In June of 2025, the Supreme Court held in Trump v. CASA, Inc. that federal courts do not have the power to issue so-called universal injunctions that apply to parties beyond the plaintiff in the case. In his March 4/April 7 order, Judge Eaton reasoned that CASA does not apply to the Court of International Trade. But the statute governing the CIT’s powers, Section 1585, says that the CIT has the same powers as other federal courts.

If and when the government appeals the March 4/April 7 order, it will also ask the court of appeals to stay—or pause—the order while the appeal plays out. Because the government’s argument that the March 4/April 7 order exceeded the CIT’s powers is strong, it is likely that the court of appeals—or the Supreme Court, if necessary—will grant the stay.

At that point, it will be clear that automatic refunds will not be coming. As a result, importers who do nothing face a significant risk that they will not receive refunds—even though the underlying tariffs were unlawful.

What will importers need to do in order to receive a refund?

If the government wins its appeal and the appellate courts reverse the universal scope of the March 4/April 7 order, then each importer will need to take legal steps to secure a refund. The most important remaining question will be: what legal steps do importers need to take?

There are two possibilities. 

(1) The importer files a protest with CPB pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514. Then, if CBP denies the protest, the importer sues in the CIT challenging that denial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).

(2) The importer sues directly in the CIT pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).

Section 1581(i) gives the CIT only “residual” jurisdiction, which means that an importer can sue under that provision only if there is no other provision under which an importer can sue. In other words, if the importer can sue under Section 1581(a), then it can’t sue under Section 1581(i).

Because Section 1581(a) provides jurisdiction for importers to challenge the denial of a protest by CBP, it could be read to mean that importers must protest and then sue under Section 1581(a), and may not sue directly in the CIT under Section 1581(i).

Why is there uncertainty about whether importers must protest before they sue in the CIT?

A central question regarding the procedures that importers must follow to receive a refund is whether they must file a protest with respect to each liquidated entry pursuant to Section 1514 and then potentially challenge CBP’s denial of that protest pursuant to Section 1581(a), or whether importers may bypass the protest process entirely and file suit pursuant to Section 1581(i).

The reason there is uncertainty about this important question is that the CIT has sent mixed signals about whether protests are required. In December of 2025, a three-judge panel of the CIT indicated that importers could skip protesting entries with IEEPA duties and proceed directly to suing in the CIT. In March of 2026, Judge Eaton indicated without elaboration that “importers should be aware of the remedies available under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (Protest against decisions of Customs Service).” As a result, it appears likely that the appellate courts will ultimately need to resolve whether protesting is required.

Moreover, the position that protests are not required sits in deep tension with Supreme Court precedent. The text and structure of Section 1514 and 1581(a) seem to indicate that importers seeking refunds must protest CBP’s liquidation of their entries. Section 1514 states that all liquidations are “final” with respect to “the legality of all orders . . . entering into” the liquidation “unless” protested. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). Section 1581(a) then channels the judicial review of any challenges to CBP’s assessment (and denial of a protest regarding the assessment). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts may not loosen statutory schemes that require litigants to exhaust their administrative remedies. See, e.g., Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016) (for a “statutory exhaustion provision . . . Congress sets the rules.”); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (“Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.”); Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, 529 U.S. 1, 23 (2000) (exhaustion requirement remains “true even if the agency does not or cannot resolve the particular contention.”); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (“No one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. . . . The rule requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy cannot be circumvented by asserting that the charge on which the complaint rests is groundless.”).

Nonetheless, a line of cases in the Federal Circuit established—and then substantially narrowed—a judge-made exception. See, e.g., Thomson Consumer Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d 1210, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that jurisdiction under Section 1581 is proper where filing a protest with CBP is “an utter futility” in cases where CBP “is powerless to perform any active role in the determination of the constitutionality of the assessment”). Relying on Thomson, in December of 2025 the CIT reasoned in the AGS case:

Plaintiffs here challenge the legality and constitutionality of Executive Orders issued by the President. In such a case, a § 1581(a) protest would be futile because “all that Customs is authorized to do is collect the” duty. Thomson Consumer, 247 F.3d at 1215. Because Customs has no authority to make any decision regarding the legality or constitutionality of the Executive Orders at issue, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) rather than § 1581(a), and liquidation of the entries at issue is not final under § 1514. While the Executive Orders are extant, there is no Customs decision of a type that can be made and protested; hence no § 1514 finality of liquidation occurs.

AGS, slip op. at 7.

In light of the Supreme Court’s cases holding that courts “may not engraft an unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception onto [a statute’s] exhaustion requirement,” Ross, 578 U.S. at 648, there is a significant risk that the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court may reverse AGS’s conclusion that importers challenging the assessment of IEEPA duties may sue under Section 1581(i) rather than Section 1581(a), thus bypassing the protest process. This concern is compounded by the fact that the relief sought in the AGS case was solely declaratory—relief for which Section 1581(a) is much more plausibly not the appropriate avenue for judicial review than a suit seeking a refund of duties paid pursuant to a liquidated entry.

This legal uncertainty creates a potential procedural trap: by the time the courts decide whether Section 1581(i) provides jurisdiction for suits seeking refunds, bypassing the protest process, the time for protesting liquidation will long since have passed. Once the 180 day protest deadline has passed, a suit under Section 1581(a) is jurisdictionally barred—and if the courts ultimately hold that protests are required, then an importer who has not timely protested loses its refund rights entirely. Moreover, timely protesting under Section 1514 does not waive a right to suit under Section 1581(i) if proves to be otherwise available.

Accordingly, a prudent importer would timely protest all liquidated entries and then—following the denial of a protest—file suit challenging the assessment of IEEPA duties under Sections 1581(a) and 1581(i) in the alternative.

How does a protest work?

A protest is the statutory mechanism by which an importer challenges CBP’s final determination of duties on a particular entry. Under Section 1514, once CBP liquidates an entry—meaning it finalizes the amount of duties owed—the importer has 180 days to file a protest. 

In a protest, the importer identifies the specific entries at issue and states the legal basis for the challenge. In the case of the IEEPA tariffs, the protest would assert that the duties were unlawful under the Supreme Court’s decision in Learning Resources. Protests are typically filed electronically through CBP’s systems and must comply with detailed regulatory requirements. Failure to properly state the legal basis for the protest or to comply with regulatory requirements may result in CBP denying the protest and the CIT affirming that denial.

After a protest is filed, CBP will review it and either grant or deny it. If CBP grants the protest, it will reliquidate the entries and issue a refund. If CBP denies the protest—or fails to act within the statutory timeframe—the importer may then file suit in the Court of International Trade under Section 1581(a) challenging that denial.

Because protests operate on an entry-by-entry basis, importers generally must file them on a rolling basis as entries liquidate. If an importer fails to file a protest within 180 days of the entry’s liquidation, CBP will deny the protest and the CIT will affirm that denial.

Why do importers need to file protests now?

Importers need to file protests now because the deadline to do so is strictly limited and runs separately for each entry.

Under 19 U.S.C. § 1514, an importer has 180 days from the date of liquidation to file a protest. Once that deadline passes, the liquidation becomes “final and conclusive,” and the importer loses the ability to challenge the duties for that entry.

The ongoing litigation does not pause or extend these deadlines. Several companies who sued in the CIT in late 2025 asked the court to order CBP to pause liquidation. The court denied that request. In March of 2026, those companies renewed their request with Judge Eaton after he indicated that protests might be necessary. The court again denied the request. As a result, as the litigation remains ongoing hundreds of thousands of entries liquidate each week and the statutory clock for the protest deadline on those entries continues the run.

The result is that if an importer waits to find out whether the courts ultimately require protests, it will likely be too late to do so. 

For that reason, many importers are filing protective protests now to preserve their rights. If courts ultimately determine that protests are required, those importers will have preserved their claims. If courts later conclude that protests were not necessary, filing them will not have caused harm. In that sense, filing protests is a way to manage procedural risk in an uncertain legal environment.

Why can’t importers get refunds through a class action?

Importers cannot rely on a class action to obtain refunds because of both the structure of customs law and limits on judicial power.

First, tariff liability is determined on an entry-by-entry basis. Each importer’s claim depends on its own import transactions, its own payment of duties, and other individualized issues. That individualized structure does not fit easily within a class-wide framework in which a single judgment binds all affected parties. For that reason, no class action has ever been certified in the CIT.

Second, a class action would face additional and likely fatal challenges if protests are required. That requirement of “administrative exhaustion” creates an individualized issue that federal courts have held in other contexts precludes class certification.

For these reasons, importers should not assume that a class action—or any single lawsuit—will result in refunds for everyone. Each importer must take steps to preserve and pursue its own claims.

How much of the IEEPA tariff duties that an importer paid will the government refund?

If an importer complies with all applicable legal requirements, including potentially protesting and suing in the CIT within the relevant time limits, the government will refund the entirety of the IEEPA duties an importer paid with interest. Interest is paid at the same rate the government pays for tax overpayments. By statute, that rate is set at 3 percentage points above the federal short-term rate. Since the IEEPA tariffs were imposed in 2025, the interest rate paid has ranged between 6 and 9 percent.

There are two important qualifications. First, eligibility for a refund is evaluated on an entry-by-entry basis. That means that if an importer has some entries that are outside of an applicable time limit and some entries that are still within that time limit, only the entries within the time limit would be eligible for refunds. Second, refunds are available only for duties that were lawfully paid on valid entries. If CBP determines that an entry is subject to adjustment for other reasons—such as classification errors, valuation issues, or other compliance matters—it may offset or deny refunds on that basis.

What are the next steps for an importer?

The most important next step for importers is to take action to ensure that their refund rights are preserved during this period of legal uncertainty.

In order to navigate this challenging environment, importers should consider consulting with legal counsel. With the assistance of counsel, we recommend the following steps:

First, importers should identify all entries on which they paid IEEPA tariffs and determine the liquidation status of those entries. Because protest deadlines run from the date of liquidation, this step is necessary to track which entries remain eligible for challenge.

Second, importers should consider filing protests on a rolling basis as entries liquidate. As explained above, timely protests are the most reliable way to preserve refund rights in light of the current uncertainty about whether protests are required.

Third, importers should monitor developments in the CIT and any appeals. The legal landscape is evolving, and appellate decisions will likely determine whether the protest process is mandatory and how broadly any relief may extend.

Finally, importers should evaluate whether and when to pursue litigation in the CIT, either following the denial of protests or, if it remains available, through direct actions under Section 1581(i). That decision will depend on both legal developments and the importer’s assessment of costs, risks, and potential recovery.

The key point is that this is not a passive process. Importers who wish to preserve their rights must take timely and affirmative steps.